对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院学术论坛邀请邀请崇志伟做:“分散的双方匹配市场:博弈论的分析与设计(Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Markets: Game-Theoretic Analyses and Design)”专题讲座。在分散的匹配规则的不完善产生不稳定的匹配,从而导致战略行为。出现了两个问题:什么是均衡诱发游戏,以及如何解决问题的规则?我们提供博弈理论分析了在读研究生招生和偏好的心理学家市场信号有和没有真诚的申请人超过容量的产品战略。在高校招生早期决定计划的研究作为一个两阶段信号博弈;申请人的信号中的第一级和学院采用在第二过容量提供的策略。我们建议我们的市场设计,检测或软终端市场和活动规则的有效执行。
Imperfections in decentralized matching rules generate unstable matchings, which leads to strategic behaviors. Two questions arise: what are the equilibria for induced games and how to fix problematic rules? We provide game-theoretic analyses for the over-capacity offering strategy in graduate school admissions and preference signaling in the psychologist market with and without sincere applicants. The early decision plan in college admissions is studied as a two-stage signaling game; applicants signal in the first stage and colleges employ the over-capacity offering strategy in the second. We propose our market design with detected or soft market termination and effective enforcement of an activity rule.
崇志伟,2006年从美国德州农工大学(Texas A&M University)获得博士学位,2008年加入中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院。主要研究兴趣在市场微观结构、双边配对和合约理论。