本文认为有两种类型的代理寻租模式。一组代理有两种类型的租金估值。选择一个代理商的基础上竞赛成功函数规模报酬不变的赢家。我们首先使纯策略的纳什均衡特性化。然后研究如何平衡工作比,奖品功耗比,总的努力水平响应,当代理变化的异质性或代理时,成分变化。基于这些均衡分析中,我们调查是否增加一个初级阶段可以享受比赛的组织者谁的目的是最大限度地从各个代理商预计总工作量。最佳的竞赛结构已充分的特点,在不同程度的异质性和代理商组成。
焦倩:新加坡国立大学经济学博士,现任中山大学岭南学院讲师。主要研究领域为应用微观理论,竞争与拍卖,和产业组织理论。学术论文发表于Public Choice, Pacific Economic Review等经济学国际期刊上。
原文:This article considers a rent-seeking model with two types of agents. A group of agents has two types of valuation of the rent. One of the agents is selected as the winner based on contest success function with constant returns to scale. We first characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then examine how the equilibrium effort ratio, the prize dissipation ratios, and the total effort level respond when the heterogeneity of agents changes or when agents composition changes. Based on these equilibrium analyses, we investigate whether adding a preliminary stage can benefit a contest organizer who aims at maximizing total expected effort from all agents. The optimal contest structure has been fully characterized at different level of heterogeneity and agents composition.