All-Pay Auctions with Private Values and Resale
地点:对外经贸大学博学楼1227
主讲人:上海交通大学隋勇助教授
摘要: This paper studies all-pay auctions with resale opportunities in a model with independent private values. Given the existence of a resale market, the primary players will compete more aggressively over an indivisible prize. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for all-pay auctions with private values and resale and derive a revenue-ranking result for all-pay auctions with and without resale opportunities. From the point of view of the initial seller, the expected revenue resulting from an all-pay auction with all potential buyers is the same as that from an all-pay auction with separate markets and resale possibilities, as long as the first-stage winner rejects all bids below her true valuation. The initial seller never gains and may lose in terms of expected revenue when the reseller can optimally set a reserve price.