对外经贸大学(青岛)

　　对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院邀请Ricard Gil作了一场题为“Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority(盘局下的适应关系)”的讲座。国际经济贸易学院有8个系，分别是：国际贸易学系、金融学系、经济学系、国际运输与物流学系、政治经济学系、国际商务与合作学系、数量经济学系、财政税务学系。 讲座的主要内容是：

　　我们研究中，各方必须反复裁缝决定世界的状态，但通常具有不同的优先决策的长期合作关系。我们的理论分析表明如何适应关系(即自我实施促进有效的适应协议)，带正规合同相结合，引起国家相关决策时无论是正式的合同或单独承包关系下的预期收益可以提高。我们的实证分析侧重于电影发行商和放映商，允许对是否显示影片以及在什么时段参展商广泛的回旋余地之间的正式收入分成合同。这些正式合同的电影完成了它运行后，即经常非正式地重新谈判，任何改编决定已经作出，由参展商后不久。我们的实证设置是有吸引力的，因为我们观察到：(1)本正式的收入分享合同条款;(2)所有的决定已经作出后发生的正式合同条款重新谈判的非正式;(3)的代理世界两个状态和适应决定(实际上是示出什么电影，以及在什么时隙)(从替代电影为同一时隙竞争的潜在收入)。我们的理论和实证研究结果表明，正式合同可以为实现波动的环境中高效适应非正式的关系奠定了基础。

　　原文：We study ongoing relationships in which parties must repeatedly tailor decisions to the state of the world, but typically have different preferred decisions. Our theoretical analysis shows how relational adaptation (i.e., self-enforcing agreements that facilitate efficient adaptation), combined with formal contracting, induces state-dependent decision-making that improves upon the expected payoffs under either formal contracting or relational contracting alone. Our empirical analysis focuses on formal revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and exhibitors that allow the exhibitor wide leeway about whether to show the movie and in what time slots. These formal contracts are often informally renegotiated after the movie has finished its run—i.e., long after any adaptation decisions have been taken by the exhibitor. Our empirical setting is attractive because we observe: (i) the formal revenue-sharing contract terms; (ii) informal renegotiations of the formal contract terms that occur after all decisions have been made; and (iii) proxies for both the state of the world (potential revenues from alternative movies competing for the same time slots) and the adaptation decisions (what movies were actually shown, and in what time slots). Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that formal contracts can be the foundation for informal relationships that achieve efficient adaptation in fluctuating environments.