主讲人:吴延辉(伦敦经济学院博士,南加州大学助教授)
本文嵌入在一个标准贸易模型A LA Melitz(2003)的委托代理公司提供的管理激励机制和管理补偿分配,以探讨全球化的影响。面对有限责任公司,与异构生产力到不同的薪酬结构自身的排序,以减轻不同层次的代理问题,由于合同摩擦。更多的生产企业使用高功率的激励合同,而生产力较低的企业使用了降低供电。一个行业内的国际贸易,提高市场竞争力,诱导从生产率低下的国内企业资源重新分配给高生产力的出口。RMS。不同的公司,在其出口状况和支付更多的患病率高功率的薪酬激励机制,管理人员和生产工人之间的工资差距较大,和一个更高层次的管理者之间的不平等的工资结构导致国际贸易上的不平衡影响。
This paper embeds a principal-agent firm in an otherwise standard trade model a la Melitz (2003) to investigate the impact of globalization on the provision of managerial incentives and on the distribution of managerial compensation. Facing contractual frictions due to limited liability, firms with heterogeneous productivity endogenously sort into different pay structures to mitigate different levels of agency problems. More productive firms use a higher-powered incentive contract while less productive firms use a lowered-powered one. International trade within an industry enhances market competition, inducing resources reallocated from low productivity domestic firms to high productivity exporting .rms. The uneven effects of international trade on firms that differ in their exporting status and pay structure result in more prevalence of high-powered incentive pay, a larger wage gap between managers and production workers, and a higher level of wage inequality among managers.