中国人民大学汉青经济与金融高级研究院助理教授叶茂亮。哈佛大学博士。同时他有工程学本科学位和工程学,经济学双相关证书。中国人民大学叶茂亮研究实验行为经济,以及包括公共经济学,劳动经济学,发展经济学和政治经济学在内的应用微观经济学。目前他在研究集体行为(例如公共物品的资源供给,协调,互信建立,解决社会困境上的合作),慈善,再分配,公众舆论(例如不平等和平等的认知,再分配的偏好),财政联邦制和主观幸福,等领域研究.
中国人民大学叶茂亮教授探讨渐进的效果,增加投资的持股比例随时间缓慢而不是立即需要高股权投资合作建设用有限次重复二进制信托(投资)的实验。中国人民大学叶茂亮理论预测建立在一种行为重复博弈模型对受托人的类型(或理性的倒数)不完整的信息。实验结果发现,渐进有助于建立在投资关系的高风险的合作:委托人的初始投资率是在大爆炸和渐进疗法相同,而受托人在渐进治疗的更高的初始速度往复运动带来更高后续投资和成功的相互合作的利率。然而,投资,互惠和相互合作的所有治疗的比率大幅到底下降(结束时的游戏效应)。以下为原文。
This paper examines the effect of gradualism -- increasing the stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake of investment immediately -- in cooperation building using a finitely repeated binary trust (investment) experiment. Our theoretical predictions build on a behavioral repeated-game model with incomplete information about the type (rational or reciprocal) of trustees. The experimental results find that gradualism helps build high-stake cooperation in the investment relationship: The initial investment rate of trustors is the same in the big bang and gradualism treatments, whereas the higher initial reciprocation rate of the trustees in the gradualism treatment leads to higher rates of subsequent investment and successful mutual cooperation. However, the rates of investment, reciprocation and mutual cooperation for all treatments sharply decrease in the end (“end-of-game” effect).