中国人民大学

　　程商政在中国人民大学做了一场题为创业投资如何提高民营企业融资效率的讲座，讲座的主要内容是：

　　我们使用美国人口普查局，其中包括私人和公共美国制造业企业在整个宇宙的纵向研究数据库(LRD)，研究关于在民营企业创业投资(VC)投资所产生的效率提高几个相关的问题。首先，这样做的风险投资确实可以提高民营企业的效率(全要素生产率，全要素生产率)，如果是这样，某些类型的VC(极高的声誉与低信誉)在产生这种效率的提高比别人更好?其次，做风投投资于更高效的企业开始与(筛选)，或者他们提高投资(监控)效率?三，不要效率的提高，由于VC的支持，从增加成本的销售或减少产生的呢?四，做VC的支持和相关的效率收益影响成功退出(IPO或收购)的概率是多少?我们的分析表明，风险投资支持的企业的总体效率比在每个时间点的非风险投资支持的公司更高。风险投资支持的公司的这种效率优势来源于两个筛查和监测：风险投资支持的公司接受融资前的效率比非风险投资支持的公司更高，并进一步向VC融资的增长效率其后是更大的此类公司。在VC支持的企业效率的提高以上分布在头两轮VC融资之后，这些公司的总要素生产率保持不变，直到退出。此外，我们还显示，虽然企业的全要素生产率之前接受融资是降低高声誉风险投资支持的公司，增加了全要素生产率的融资随后是显著更高的这些公司，具有更大的监测能力高的声誉风险投资是一致的。我们解开使用三种不同的方法筛选和VC后盾监督作用：开关回归与内源性开关，回归不连续性分析和倾向得分匹配。我们表明，虽然受VC的支持所产生的整体效率的提高主要源于提高销量，高声誉风险投资支持的企业效率的提高也产生于生产成本的降低而增加。最后，我们的研究表明，VC备份和相关联的效率的提高产生积极的影响对于成功退出的可能性。

　　原文：We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms, to study several related questions regarding the efficiency gains generated by venture capital (VC) investment in private firms. First, do VCs indeed improve the efficiency (total factor productivity, TFP) of private firms, and if so, are certain kinds of VCs (high reputation vs. low reputation) better at generating such efficiency gains than others? Second, do VCs invest in more efficient firms to begin with (screening), or do they improve efficiency after investment (monitoring)? Third, do efficiency improvements due to VC backing arise from increases in sales or reductions in costs? Fourth, do VC backing and the associated efficiency gains affect the probability of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition)? Our analysis shows that the overall efficiency of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms at every point in time. This efficiency advantage of VC-backed firms arises from both screening and monitoring: The efficiency of VC-backed firms prior to receiving financing is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, and further, the growth in efficiency subsequent to VC financing is greater for such firms. The above increases in efficiency of VC-backed firms are spread over the first two rounds of VC financing after which the TFP of such firms remains constant until exit. Additionally, we show that while the TFP of firms prior to receiving financing is lower for high-reputation VC-backed firms, the increase in TFP subsequent to financing is significantly greater for these firms, consistent with high-reputation VCs having greater monitoring ability. We disentangle the screening and monitoring effects of VC backing using three different methodologies: switching regression with endogenous switching, regression discontinuity analysis, and propensity score matching. We show that while overall efficiency gains generated by VC backing arise primarily from improvements in sales, the efficiency gains of high-reputation VC-backed firms arise also from lower increases in production costs. Finally, we show that VC backing and the associated efficiency gains positively affect the probability of a successful exit.